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Micajah and Estella Jiggetts were joint tenants without sur-
vivorship of certain realty. In 1929 they executed a joint will which
read in part, "Second: We hereby direct that the survivor herein
shall take all of the property of the first of us to die, both real and
personal, for life, with complete power to dispose of the whole or
any part thereof in such manner as he or she may see fit, and what-
ever remains undisposed of at the death of the said survivor, we
direct that it shall pass to our issue, if any, and in the event that
there is no such issue, then one-half of such estate shall pass to our
adopted daughter, Annie Cage Townes, and the other half to be
divided equally among our nearest relatives living at the death of the
survivor . . ." Thereafter, their son, William Henry Jiggetts, was
born. In 1941 Estella Jiggetts died, and Micajah executed another
will which provided in part, "Second: All the rest, residue and re-
mainder of my property, real, personal and mixed, wheresoever the
same may be situated, I give, devise and bequeath to my son, Wil-
liam Henry Jiggetts, in fee simple and absolute property." In 1948
William Henry, still an infant, killed his father for the purpose of
obtaining the property, followed by a confession and conviction of
murder. Suit was instituted to have it adjudged that he was barred
from taking as his father's devisee. It was so decreed, on the theory
that Micajah Jiggetts had taken a power of appointment under his
wife's will, exercised it in his second will, and that William Henry
Jiggetts was barred from taking under such will by Code of Vir-
ginia § 64-18 (1950).1 On appeal, held, reversed. The one-half
interest of Estella Jiggetts vested in William Henry Jiggetts under
his mother's will, subject to a life estate and inter vivos power of
disposition in the father. The rule of May v. Joynes, 20 Grat. 692,
(Va. 1871) is not applicable because of Code of Virginia § 55-7
(1950),2 and § 64-18 does not operate to take away the vested
estate. Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192 Va. 337, 64 S. E. 2d 809 (195i).
While the facts of the case do not come within the words of
§ 64-18, it seems that a more equitable result could have been
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 64-18 (1950) ("no person shall acquire by descent
or distribution, or by will, any interest in the estate of another whom he
has killed in order to obtain such interest.")
2. Rule v. First Nat. Bank of Clifton Forge, 182 Va. 227, 28 S.Y.2d 709
(1944).
reached by application of common law principles. No issue can be
taken with the finding that the gift over is preserved by § 55-7; the
statutory modification of May v. Joynes is squarely in point, as
noted in 37 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1951). Even a vested estate, how-
ever, can be forfeited under certain circumstances.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court of Appeals follows Welsh
v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. 2d 872 (1950), in which it is said,
"There is no law in this State that deprives appellee of his vested
right in the whole of the estate as the surviving joint tenant. Our
State constitution expressly provides that all penalties shall be pro-
portioned to the nature of the offense, and that no conviction shall
work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate; . . ." In Oleff v.
Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N. E. 838 (1935) the theory is
advanced that property rights are too sacred to be denied because
of public policy! In bringing about a similar result in the Jiggetts
case, Justice Whittle says, "The reason the son is allowed the bene-
fit of the shortened life estate is because this statute does not
prohibit it. Code Section 64-18 is a penal law, divesting a person of
rights otherwise accorded to him under the law, and it must be
strictly construed."
It is believed that the cases upon which the Supreme Court of
Appeals relied can be distinguished from the case at hand. In the
first place, in Welsh v. James, Perry C. James unlawfully took the
life of his wife, but no mention is made of his having killed her to
obtain the property. In Virginia even § 64-18 only applies when
the murder was committed for the express purpose of obtaining the
property.3 Therefore, the principle of this case is not applicable to
the facts of Blanks v. Jiggetts, where the object of the killing was
to obtain the property. "Corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate"4
has no application to the devolution of property, but is intended to
protect the criminal's estate5 from automatic forfeiture upon suicide
or conviction of a felony. The common law, so far as it is not incon-
sistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States or of the
State of Virginia is the rule of decision in the courts of this state.
6
Therefore, what is to prevent applying the common law maxim,
"that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong,
3. Ward v. Ward, 174 Va. 331. 6 S.E.2d 664 (1940).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-4 (1950).
5. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-10 (1950).
or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property
by his own crime7 . . .?1
Secondly, in Oleff v. Hodapp, supra, Apostal signed a contract
with his nephew Tego which provided, "We, the undersigned,
owners of Joint Account ... do hereby agree and jointly authorize
and order said company to pay any and all of the credits now or here-
after on said account, to the order of any one or more of us, both be-
fore, after and notwithstanding the death or other incapacity of any
one or more of us." Apostal was killed by a third person, but Tego
was also found guilty as a moral force behind the crime. Thus it can
be seen that Tego's right in the account was as absolue as Apostal's,
before the crime. Judge Zimmerman in his concurring opinion said,
"How can we logically take his own property away from him ?" In
sharp contrast is the situation in Blanks v. Jiggetts, where the son
had but a vested remainder subject to defeasance by inter vivos dis-
position.
Setting up a constructive trust for the benefit of those named
in the joint will of 1929 in case there should be no issue was not
discussed at all. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 188 reads,
"where two persons have an interest in property and the interest
of one of them is enlarged by his murder of the other, to the extent
to which it is enlarged he holds it upon a constructive trust for the
estate of the other."'8 Accordingly, William Henry Jiggetts should
be compelled to surrender his whole interest upon a constructive
trust, for there was a substantial contingency whereby he might not
have received anything except for the murder.9 The statement by
James Barr Ames that, "One and all overlooked that beneficent
principle in our law by which equity, acting in personam, compels
one who by misconduct has acquired a res at common law to hold
the res as a constructive trustee for the person wronged, or if he
be dead, for his representatives,"' 0 appears to apply to the court in
this case.
In New York Life Insurance Company v. Davis, 96 Va. 737,
32 S. E. 475 (1899) "It was conceded that if the policies were taken
7. 9 R.C.L § 41; Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
8. 3 ScoTT, TRusTs § 493.1 (1939); Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137
S.E. 188 (1927); Note, Right of Murderer to Acquire PAropedrty by Oper-
ation of Condition Subsequent That Property Shall Revert on Grantee's
Death. 37 MIcH. L REv. 965 (1939).
9. RESTATEmmNT, RESTITUTION, § 188, comment (c); 82 U. PA. L REV.
183 (1933).
10. AMES, IEcTuREs ON LEGAL HISTORY 314 (1913).
out by Davis in good faith and were valid in their incipiency, their
subsequent assignment to Lester, although procured by him with a
view to the murder of the insured and the collection of the policies,
would not prevent a recovery on them for the estate of the de-
ceased."' 11 There the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld
the maxim that no one should profit from his own wrong, the settled
rule as to the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. 12 Since the legal
title actually vests in the beneficiary of the insured, 13 application of
the principle in Blanks v. Jiggetts would have required that the
beneficiary not be deprived of his rights in the insurance proceeds.
Thus in the Dawis case an equitable result is reached, but strictly
speaking an individual is deprived of a vested interest; whereas in
the Jiggetts case technically the result is correct, but a gross mis-
carriage of justice is allowed. The sound answer is set forth in
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 189: The establishment
of a constructive trust for the estate of the party wronged. In this
manner the legal title is surrendered by the undeserving recipient
to the deceased's estate. As set forth in a West Virginia case,' 4 "and
it is likewise very uniformly held, and it occurs to us upon sound
reason, that, where the beneficiary in a policy of life insurance is
denied the right of recovery upon grounds of public policy, a trust
results in favor of the estate of the insured, and ordinarily the
personal representative of the insured can maintain a suit to re-
cover the fund for thebenefit of that estate."15
It is provided by statute1 6 that if a wife wilfully deserts or aban-
dons her husband she shall lose all interest in his estate as "tenant
by dower, distributee or otherwise." If such a person can lose her
dower in property by desertion, a fortiori one should be deprived of
an interest in property received as a result of murder !
It is difficult to reconcile oneself to the decision of the court
with reasoning based mainly upon two cases dearly distinguishable
from Blanks v. Jiggetts. The Supreme Court of Appeals cannot be
trying to tell us that property rights are more sacred than human
11. Note that no mention is made in the Davis ase of corruption of blood
or forfeiture of estate.
12. Johnston v. Metropolitan L Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 SME. 865
(1919); 4 POMROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCB § 1054(e) (5th Ed.
1941).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-119 (1950).
14. Johnston v. Metropolitan L Ins. Co., rupra, at 867.
15. Schmidt v. Northern Life Asso., 112 Iowa 41, 83 N.W. 800 (1900);
Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso., LIL 1 Q.B. 147 (1892).
16. VA. CODE ANN. §64-35 (1950).
life. Does not the fact that the decision puts a premium on this type
of murder arouse an honest citizen's sense of fair play?17 The court
fails to present one convincing reason for its decision. A point worth
noting is that the court does not refer to the possible solution men-
tioned herein, supported by cases, writers, and the RESTATE-
MENT. Therefore the equitable justice recommended is submitted
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia with an eye to the
future.
PETER SHEBELL, JR.
17. Certainly a court of law can not be "hindered" by the prindiples of a
theological institution--the separation must always be distinct! Blanks
v. Jiggetts, supra, at 343, 64 S.B.2d at 812.
